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Abstract: The lightweight computational nodes being used in WSN 
pose particular challenge for many security applications. This paper 
investigates a number of security techniques and novel 
implementations appropriate for WSN nodes, including various trade-
offs such as implementation complexity, power dissipation, security 
flexibility and scalability.  





Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are widely used by diverse communication 
systems [5]. However, WSN are constrained by limited resources which include 
limited communication range and limited energy. Furthermore, the lightweight 
computational nodes that are deployed in WSN create challenges for many current 
security applications. This paper investigates a new security technique and suitable 
implementation for WSN, including various trade-offs such as implementation 
complexity, power dissipation [2], security flexibility and scalability. This 
enhanced security application is aimed at developing a network that has efficient 
and flexible key distribution scheme secured enough to prevent algorithmic 
complexity and denial of service attacks while conserving energy [3]. A re-
evaluation of Blom’s key generation was implemented [4]. The aim was to provide 
a secured pre-allocation and distribution of keys by every single node in WSS with 
a piece of data that would be generating a pairwise key with every other node in 
the network as shown in Fig.1; implemented in Contiki operating system due to its 
advantages of multi threading. The resultant pairwise key generated with a piece 
of data was then used for generating an AES-encrypted pairwise key with every 
other node in the network. The novelty of this research includes: 
(a) A key allocation and Key Pre-distribution smart security technique to secure 
Base station and the sensor nodes before deployment. 
(b) A unique mesh routing mechanism that also sets up the system for encryption 
with trade-off in power consumption 
(c) A unique combination of advanced encryption standard (AES) with key 
management technique. 
(d) A unique alternative security mechanism with TCP/IP configuration 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: 
The next section presents the related works by researchers in this field, followed 
by a description of the geometrical solution of key management scheme in Section 
3. Section 4 describes the implementation of the enhanced security in Contiki OS. 
Section 5 showcases the implementation in real sensor motes and compares the 









2 Related works 
 
WSN is useful in the automotive industry; advanced lighting and night vision in 
addition to creative technology that help conform to the economy of fuel 
reduction, environment and road safety have so far been implemented. The 
combination of WSN and microcontrollers technologies have led to the 
production of devices such as passenger restraints, airbags, anti-lock brakes, 
stability control, etc [5]. Wireless sensor networks do not differ from all other 
network embedded systems in the areas of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of data but rather the WSN communication structure illustrates the 
setting under which nodes or clusters send signals to the base station in the 
presence of an intruder. 
Moreover, Wireless sensor network facilitates many other numerous 
application areas for instance, tactical observation by military unattended 
sensor networks, elderly and patient monitoring by body area networks 
(BANs) and by building automation and control networks (BACnets) [6]. 
Researchers are still concerned if WSN can actually be secured considering 
that messages can be intercepted based on what was sent, whom it was sent to, 
when the message was sent and where the message was sent from and to [3]. 
They are also considering the level of integrity of the system in terms of the 
actions of the intruders to insert, delete and/or change the message that was 
sent. How accurate the final information will be with consideration of denial of 
service is currently being investigated. Therefore, improvements in the latest 
electronic technology has also brought about the idea of deploying small, low 
power, low-cost sensor devices in the Oil and Gas Industries. Various security 
issues that have received consideration in ad hoc networks [7, 8] are not 
applicable to WSN due to architectural disparity between these two types of 
networks [5]. Also, quite a number of other security schemes are already being 
proposed. If the cluster formation design by [9] currently being investigated is 
found to be effective in saving energy, there is need to look at the security 
between the individual nodes, neighbouring nodes and the base station. Moreover, 
the majority of current security applications proposed is not viable due to low 
memory to run complicated algorithm after running the Operating System (OS) 
and other applications. This is due to the fact that all security services are assured 
by cryptography; therefore, security in WSN will amount to a sizeable amount of 
energy consumption due to cryptographic functions [5].  
Many WSN deployments are security sensitive and attacks against them may lead 
to damage to health and safety of people. Denial of service creates conditions for 
hardware failures, resource exhaustion, bugs, malicious attacks and environmental 
conditions that could reduce the functionality or totally eliminating a networks 
ability to perform as expected [10]. It has been argued by Wood and Stankovic 
[13] that the possible security attack on the network layer is due to neglect, greed, 
homing, misdirection, authorisation, probing, blackholes and monitoring.  Further 
research and more detailed study by Karlof and Wagner [15] put specific names 
and methodologies to these attacks. These network attacks are classified as 
follows: 
a) Spoofing, replaying or altering clustering messages: This is the most direct 
attack in the network. A malicious node by spoofing, altering  or replaying  routing  
information in  the  network can mount a DoS attack by making itself part of the 
routing formation and then creating  routing  loops, attracting or repelling traffic, 
generating false error  messages,  shortening  or extending  source routes  or 
partitioning  the network [10]. It can also select the forward packets to reduce the 
probability of detection.  One method to combat the threat is by authentication and 
antireplay protection. Another technique is by multipath routing. The multipath 
routing sends the same data over multiple paths to give it a higher probability of 
reaching its destination [13]. 
3 Geometrical Solutions for Key Management Scheme 
Blom proposed a key generation system that is symmetric and allows nodes to 
generate a pairwise secret key with a secured communication among the 
uncompromised nodes.. This is the reason for using Blom’s pairwise key pre-
distribution idea in the WSS base station to construct (λ+1) × N matrix G over 
finite field GF(q). Although, Blom’s scheme does not propose how G matrix 
should be generated, the only requirement is that its columns must be linearly 
independent in order to achieve the λ-secure property. In our implementation, we 
decided to use the Vandermonde [14, 15 and 16] matrix since it is easy to 
implement and meets the requirement. A random symmetric (λ+1) × (λ+1) matrix 
D over finite field GF(q) should also be constructed. The matrix D is considered to 
be private information and none of the nodes in the WSS is supposed to know the 
D matrix while G can be known. In order to calculate the final K matrix from 
which we can extract the pairwise keys, the base station should first multiply the D 
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Along with G matrix the base station also generates random symmetric 
 matrix over a finite field ( )GF q but unlike G matrix, the D 
matrix is kept secret and must not be disclosed to any sensor node or adversary in 
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The D matrix must be generated all at once and it has to be stored in the base 
station the entire lifespan of the network. 
 is  matrix that is the result of computation  where 
 is transpose of (DG). Each row of a matrix is disclosed the one sensor in 
the wireless sensor network in order to allow the node to generate its pairwise key 
with other sensors. 
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In practice, since the base station does not preserve the entire G matrix, a row of A 
matrix rA   
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rA is generated from the column of G matrix cG  at a time when a sensor is 
connecting to the network as follows: 
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TK AG DG G                          (7)  
 
Since K is a N x N symmetric matrix, therefore if node n would get n : th row from 
K and wish to communicate with node m it will just take the m : th column of the n 
: th row and use the value as the pairwise key, since K is symmetrical, therefore 
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K is therefore a symmetric matrix. This means that  where  is an 
element of K on i-th row and j-th column. ,j iK is used as a pairwise key between 






In practice when node i  wants to communicate with node j , it sends the 
seed is . Node j  is then able to generate the column cG  of matrix G and 
using the row rA  of matrix A it received from the base station compute pairwise 
key ,i jK  as follows: 
During implementation, it was discovered that the scheme will not be effective 
with the original idea due to the following reasons: We would have to store 
information for every single node. We would have to know the exact number 
nodes in the network. When adding a new node we would have to update 
information on every single node. Therefore instead of storing n:th row of the K 
matrix we should store n:th of the A = (DG)
T
 matrix. That gives us (λ+1) columns 
on every single node. When two nodes want to communicate, they will first 
exchange their seeds S
N
 where S is a primitive element of GF(q) and n is the 
number of nodes in the network, therefore the K generated becomes: 
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That gives us sufficient scalability so we can add new nodes without breaking 
down the running network. The base station keeps a counter of number of nodes in 
the network and when a new node n wants to join the network, the base station 
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Therefore, the base station keeps track only of the matrix seed S
n
 where n is the 
number of currently connecting node and generates column Gc for the node. The 
base station also sends the seed S
N
 and the n : th row of A to the node n. The node 
n is now ready for distribution. 
The problem with Blom’s Pairwise Key Pre-Distribution Scheme is that it 
provides only 2log q bits long encryption key where q is the top of the finite field 
( )GF q  so if we wanted to have 128 bits long encryption key we would have to 
have G, D, A and K matrices over the finite field. 
 
 128 38(2 ) (3.40282367 10 )GF GF     (11) 
 
So instead of generating G, D, A and K matrices over finite field cG we decided to 
generate set of 16 D matrices. Let s be the secure property   
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Therefore we must calculate set of 16 A matrices. Let s be the secure property (λ + 
1)  
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Now, we have to provide each node with a matrix P composed of rows from each 
of the A matrices. Let  represents matrix P composed of rows of 16 A matrices 
provided to node i . 
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That way, it is possible to generate 16 pairwise keys with each node in the network 
and provide the keys to the AES algorithm. Let Gc be the column of  generated 
out of seed is  provided by node i  ( 1, 2,..., 16)A A A be the set of generated A  
matrices and PK  be the column provided to AES as a encryption key, then: 
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This paper proposes a number of techniques for Enhanced Security 
Implementation as follows: 
 
4 Description of the proposed method through example 
 
For the implementation of the proposed enhanced security mechanism, Micaz 
motes were used along with Contiki operating system [8]. Micaz has a radio 
frequency range between 2400MHz to 2483.5MHz with maximum data rate of 
250kbps. They receive and transmit power at 19.7mA and 17.4mA respectively. 
Micaz uses DSSS-O-QPSK modulation with a receive sensitivity of -94dBm. The 
outdoor range is between 75m to 100m and operates with multichannel advantage. 
Given that most of the nodes have a limited energy supply, the transceiver 
therefore functions as a tolerable balance between data rate and energy 
consumption [9]. Micaz uses a micro controller with a clock frequency of 7.37 
MHz. Random access memory (RAM) is 4KB and ROM 128KB. It was originally 
connected with TinyOS as the operating system. But in this paper the TinyOS was 
replaced with Contiki OS. All these features make Micaz an appropriate research 
platform suitable for this experiment. Contiki is a lightweight operational system 
developed for constrained platform, such as sensor nodes. Its basic configuration 
fits in less than 2 KiB of RAM and 40 KiB of ROM, and provides two 
communication stacks (µIP [10] and Rime [11]) as well as multi threading 
functionalities. All its modules, drivers and user application are implemented in C 
programming. While Although TinyOS is generally used but Contiki has a much 
easier learning curve for the developer and researchers, because it is based on a 




Fig. 2 Typical wireless sensor network set up 
Key Allocation: K keys in the Base station using unicast implements a mechanism 
whereby new nodes can be added without breaking down the network, giving 
sufficient scalability. The method involves sending a request to the Base station. 
When base station receives a unicast request, it generates a key and sends it to the 
node. When node receives the key, it stops to unicast to the base station and start 
to unicast to all its neighbours.  
Key Pre-distribution: Easy deployment of security key algorithm implements the 
deployment of the generated k pairwise key from the Base station. When base 
station receives a unicast request, it generates key and sends it to the node. When 
node receives the key, it stops to unicast to the base station and start to unicast to 
its entire neighbours. The first thing that happens is that it will request a unicast 
seed. When the node receives a seed request: it unicast its seed to the sender. 
When sender receives the seed, it says something like "Sending message to node 
x.y using pairwise key k". When the node receives a message it says something 
like "Received message from x.y, using pairwise key k". This system is an 
efficient security key algorithm method for pre-distribution. 
Mesh preallocation, routing and set-up stage for encryption intelligently 
implements Mesh pre-allocation routing mechanism. The code implements 
pairwise key preallocation, routing, and when communication is initialized, first 
the sender sends it’s pairwise key seed to the receiver. The receiver responds with 
its pairwise key seed and then the sender sends the message. The seeds are used 
for initiating encryption using AES. The mesh module sends packets using multi-
hop routing to a specified receiver in the network using the Rime communication 
stack [11]. 
Encrypting the Pairwise Key with AES- Advanced encryption Standard: key 
management is a security mechanism, an added version to make the network 
further secured. It implements a modification to advanced encryption standard and 
improves the performance of AES, thereby accommodating the key management 
system with low memory capability and energy consumption. The new 
modification was implemented in Cooja simulator [12]. 16 bytes encryption was 
also generated to concur with the standard of AES needed for the encryption and 
decryption. 
Alternative security mechanisms: The paper proposes an interface with sensor 
nodes within an IP address: integration of IP-enabled WSN nodes and Non-IP-
enabled nodes and to showcase the deployment and operational architecture during 
implementation. The process will involve a modification of uIP open source stack 
[10] to accommodate the sensor nodes code using the key distribution method as 
basis for routing mechanism. This method provides security for the IP address in 
sensors without creating problems of overhead, and memory capacity. Data can 
therefore, be easily transferred with the actualization and implementation of this 
contribution.  
 
5  Comparison of solutions 
 
This algorithm was implemented with Micaz hardware using Contiki OS and run 
with Cooja, a flexible java-based simulator that is designed to simulate a network 
of sensors running the Contiki OS. It shows a strong key pre-allocation mechanism 
using linear cryptography, high performance and low memory usage. The key 
generated in the base station for 20 nodes is shown in Figure 3. In the 
experimentation, authentication, integrity and privacy were achieved. The overall 
energy consumption can also be reduced significantly in the hardware to 
encourage the massive distribution of sensor nodes in areas that cannot easily be 
reached like under- water sensing and hurricane monitoring. 
 
--- [K] ---- 
4670 52433 38702 55127 40113 53384 40793 52298 39267 51083 38082 50093 
39640 54923 38860 53198 38817 51768 40053 54262  
52433 588519 432400 614687 443222 593964 459064 589420 442914 573252 
423342 558092 440660 612017 435822 599255 430517 581797 443315 608983  
38702 432400 323117 456169 332051 449153 334924 436342 322853 422487 
318547 422876 330344 457289 326897 441561 318635 431382 326464 450119  
55127 614687 456169 638872 474561 615423 483352 609893 467200 596293 
453673 575843 469211 638175 465330 630975 459291 610882 472569 633608  
40113 443222 332051 474561 351548 455393 356313 442888 338403 442849 
331257 431595 339244 473757 329693 455494 334509 447697 349330 464545  
53384 593964 449153 615423 455393 606864 465500 599466 453505 579691 
431347 569417 449305 615812 448064 613656 444249 596955 458971 617620  
40793 459064 334924 483352 356313 465500 359377 458379 342803 443545 
337418 440045 348842 479830 339982 463991 330656 453627 350749 470115  
52298 589420 436342 609893 442888 599466 458379 595370 447106 568858 
418831 561653 441855 610387 437592 597417 432371 578308 446533 606989  
39267 442914 322853 467200 338403 453505 342803 447106 332000 430506 
322632 426276 336035 467134 324213 452014 324456 440784 334713 458291  
51083 573252 422487 596293 442849 579691 443545 568858 430506 556000 
425289 539270 433575 598974 427148 584362 419010 569306 435333 595057  
38082 423342 318547 453673 331257 431347 337418 418831 322632 425289 
310243 406065 320039 445744 316856 438244 320874 431575 327044 446665  
50093 558092 422876 575843 431595 569417 440045 561653 426276 539270 
406065 532547 425410 582212 425407 583427 421689 555243 431073 571786  
 
Fig 3 Implementation of pre-distribution keys in Micaz using Contiki OS and run 
with Cooja 
Key distribution 
99 ID:3 Starting 'Receive key' 
1383 ID:1 unicast message_sent to: 1 
2384 ID:1 unicast message_sent to: 2 
3386 ID:1 unicast message_sent to: 3 
3386 ID:3 Key received: 233546169 881213426 960794652 3312744758 3960419106 
1528885228 2744654277 2898887135 2096983033 2017393389  
4387 ID:1 unicast message_sent to: 4 
5389 ID:1 unicast message_sent to: 5 
6390 ID:1 unicast message_sent to: 6 
6390 ID:6 Key received: 3435371504 3473273106 3570396769 3272078321 
3771928141 3975712307 4029857203 887080301 1194018876 975187624  
7392 ID:1 unicast message_sent to: 7 
8393 ID:1 unicast message_sent to: 8 
9395 ID:1 unicast message_sent to: 9 
9395 ID:9 Key received: 2290326245 429090836 1763846052 1988035590 
953447484 3403739712 2573806782 3387090282 487355124 3951102926  
10396 ID:1 unicast message_sent to: 10 
10396 ID:10 Key received: 354192334 3176386636 3966658186 3346232414 
1655610952 1609361703 623970377 3769441602 3274226730 1209534441 
Fig. 4  Key distribution 
 
 
Fig. 5   Cooja simulation 
  
Fig. 6  Key Management Encrypted with AES 
The experimental results are encouraging. They are depicted in Figure 3, 4, 5 and 
6 showing different stages of security implementations which includes pairwise 
Key generation, Key distribution in the Base station, simulation with Cooja, sensor 
node placement and Key management encrypted with AES. It shows that a 
wireless sensor network can be secured from denial of service attack with a 
minimal usage of memory capacity and low energy consumption with higher 
reliability and better authentication technique. The key management technique also 
shows a great scalability advantage and maintains a significant impact on the 
performance metrics. The enhanced security method is therefore expected to 
demonstrate even better secured network with the integration of IP-enabled WSN 
nodes 
 
We tested our two applications using Cooja that comes preinstalled on the Instant 
Contiki distribution. It provides various tools to debug ContikiOS applications 
without having physical sensors by emulating them. Firstly we have chosen 
strategic position of one base station and three nodes. The programs were designed 
to communicate to the node of ID 3, so we placed node 3 next to the base station, 
node with ID 2 on a place so it can reach node with ID 3 to test single-hop 
communication and the last node with ID 4 so it can reach node with ID 2 but 
cannot reach node with ID 3 to test the multi-hop communication. Table 1 shows 
the positions of nodes 1, 2, 3, 4 
 
Table 1 Sensor node positioning 

















After the positioning of the sensor nodes, Fig. 7 below shows the illustrative 













Fig. 7  Node Placements in the Network 
 
Also, the following screenshots as shown in Figure 8 illustrates the visibility of 
each node in the wireless sensor network. 
 




The table below shows speeds of single-hop and multi-hop communication for key 
pre-distribution and communication phase for both uIP and Rime protocols. 
 
Table 2  Key Pre-distribution and Communication Phase 



















* Pre-allocation in Rime's example is made using unicast that correctly does not 
allow pre-allocation on multi-hop connections. Because uIP communication uses 
Rime's mesh connection by default, it automatically allows pre-allocation phase on 
multi-hop and further steps are needed to forbid this behaviour. 
 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
Without a clear perspective of the risk involved in WSS and options available to 
manage the risks by intruders, it is infeasible to have a defensible network. 
Therefore, developing a security protocol can be quite challenging. The enhanced 
security application for WSS if properly implemented can bring total significant 
change to the scope of wireless sensor networks and increase its usefulness. Faster 
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